Willashia Williams v. City of York by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-24-2020 
Willashia Williams v. City of York 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Willashia Williams v. City of York" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 707. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/707 
This July is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 





UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 












CITY OF YORK, PENNSYLVANIA; VINCENT MONTE; 
TERRY SEITZ; NICHOLAS FIGGE 
 
Vincent Monte; Terry Seitz; Nicholas Figge, 




On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 1-15-cv-00493) 
District Judge: Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
 
 




Before: HARDIMAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit 
Judges. 
 
(Filed July 24, 2020) 
 
Frank J. Lavery Jr. [Argued] 
Stephen B. Edwards 
Lavery Law 
225 Market Street 
Suite 304, P.O. Box 1245 
Harrisburg, PA 17108 
 
Donald B. Hoyt 
City of York 
101 South George Street 
York, PA 17401 
  Attorneys for Appellants Vincent Monte and 
Nicholas Figge  
 
Sean P. McDonough 
Dougherty Leventhal & Price 
75 Glenmaura National Boulevard 
Moosic, PA 18507 
  Attorney for Appellant Nicholas Terry Seitz 
 
Frank J. Lavery Jr. [Argued] 
Stephen B. Edwards 
Lavery Law 
225 Market Street 
Suite 304, P.O. Box 1245 
Harrisburg, PA 17108 




Lisa W. Basial* 
[Argued] 
Niles Benn 
James F. Logue 
Benn Law Firm 
103 East Market Street 
P.O. Box 5185 
York, PA 17405 




OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
 
HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge. 
 When a district court denies a public official qualified 
immunity at summary judgment and the official appeals, the 
scope of our review is limited. We can review “whether the set 
of facts identified by the district court is sufficient to establish 
a violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” 
Ziccardi v. City of Philadelphia, 288 F.3d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 
2002). But generally, “we lack jurisdiction to consider whether 
the district court correctly identified the set of facts that the 
summary judgment record is sufficient to prove.” Id. In 
recognition of that limited jurisdiction, we have announced two 
supervisory rules that facilitate our review and enhance the 
reliability of district courts’ decisionmaking. First, in Forbes v. 
Township of Lower Merion, 313 F.3d 144 (3d Cir. 2002), we 
 




required district courts “to specify those material facts that are 
and are not subject to genuine dispute and explain their 
materiality.” Id. at 146. Second, in Grant v. City of Pittsburgh, 
98 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1996), we required courts to “analyze 
separately, and state findings with respect to, the specific 
conduct of each [defendant].” Id. at 126. 
 This appeal provides an occasion for us to stress the 
importance of these supervisory rules. Willashia Williams sued 
the City of York and three of its police officers under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983, claiming excessive force and false arrest. The District 
Court rejected the officers’ qualified immunity defense, and 
they appealed. In so doing, the Court did not appreciate the 
significance of our recent decision in Jutrowski v. Township of 
Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018). As a result, it risked 
subjecting the officers to trial regardless of whether Williams 
can establish their personal involvement in the constitutional 
violations she alleges. Had the District Court followed the two 
supervisory rules that we emphasize today, it would have 
facilitated appellate review and enhanced the reliability of its 
decision.  
 Because the District Court erred in concluding the 
officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for false arrest 
and the excessive force Williams alleges, we will reverse. 
I 
 On the evening of March 12, 2013, a police officer in 
York, Pennsylvania reported a shooting over the radio and said 
the suspects fled in a white vehicle. The suspects’ vehicle 
pulled in front of Sergeant Nicholas Figge, who was in uniform 
but driving an unmarked police car. Figge saw three people in 
the vehicle. He and Officer Jason Jay pursued the vehicle, 
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which crashed outside of their view. When Jay arrived at the 
scene of the crash, the driver and other passenger had already 
fled from the scene, but he saw one of the passengers flee 
southward on foot. Figge arrived moments later but left to 
pursue the driver, who was reportedly running northward. After 
Figge left, Jay found a spent .38 caliber shell casing inside the 
vehicle. 
 According to Williams, she and her then-boyfriend 
Jason Scott were at a park in York shortly before the shooting, 
and an unidentified police officer told them to evacuate the 
area. To get home more quickly, they decided to run. 
 While still “within close geographical proximity” to the 
crash, Figge observed Williams and Scott running eastbound 
on Princess Street toward Pine Street, which goes northward. 
Williams v. City of York, 2018 WL 5994603, at *1, *6 n.14 
(M.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2018). Figge reported his observations over 
the radio, stating, “They’re running. They’re running 
eastbound on Princess towards Pine. One of the guys has kind 
of a red jacket on, long dreads, blue pants, with a white stripe. 
The other guy’s got a black jacket with an orange stripe.” Id. at 
*1. Figge held his firearm outside the window of his vehicle 
and ordered Williams and Scott to get on the ground. Scott 
complied immediately, but Williams ran to the porch of a house 
and started pounding on the door. Figge stayed in his police car 
until other officers arrived. 
 Moments later, Officer Vincent Monte arrived and saw 
Williams and Scott face down on the ground. Monte parked his 
car and handcuffed Scott. Once other officers arrived, 
including Officer Terry Seitz, Figge exited his vehicle and told 
them to “grab” Williams. Id. According to Williams, Seitz 
“threw her to the ground [and] the officers were ‘really forceful 
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and rough with [her], like [she] was a man.’” Id. Williams 
complained and yelled at the officers that she needed to “pick 
a wedgie,” but was unable to do so because she was lying on 
her stomach. Id. at *2; Monte Exterior Cam 2:24-30. 
According to Figge, Monte, and Seitz (collectively, the 
Officers), Williams “was kicking, flailing around, being 
disorderly, and yelling while she was being handcuffed.” Id. at 
*2. And she “refused orders to place her hands behind her back, 
was being uncooperative, and swearing at officers.” Id. Seitz 
eventually handcuffed Williams, while an unidentified officer 
placed a knee on her back. After police took Williams and Scott 
into custody, an officer ordered someone to get on the ground, 
and Scott yelled at Williams, “Hey babe, calm down man!” Id. 
 As Seitz was walking Williams to his car, she tripped on 
an unidentified officer’s foot. Monte could not have tripped 
Williams because his dashcam footage shows him placing 
Scott in his police car at the time Williams tripped. But Monte 
did see Williams “on the ground kicking and screaming.” Id. 
Williams then had the following interaction with officers: 
 Officer: “If you don’t stop, I am going to tase 
you!” 
 Officer: “Stop or I’ll tase you!” 
 Officer: “Relax! Relax!” 
 Williams: “Get off of me!” 
 Officer: “Stop or I’ll tase you!” 
 Williams: “Get off of me!” 
 Officer: “Relax!” 
7 
 
 Williams: “Get off of me!” 
Officer: “There ain’t nothing you’re going to say or do 
that is going to get you out  of . . .” 
 Williams: “I’m not doing shit!” 
 Officer: “Shut your mouth.” 
 Williams: “. . . my fucking . . .” 
Officer: “Now stand up and act like you have some 
sense.” 
Id.  
 Figge ordered Seitz to cite Williams for disorderly 
conduct. Seitz then placed Williams in his car and transported 
her to City Hall. According to the Officers, when Williams was 
at City Hall she “was extremely noisy, loudly pounding her free 
arm on a metal wall.” Id. Seitz handcuffed Williams’s left arm 
to a bench. While handcuffed, her boyfriend (Scott) yelled at 
Williams to calm down, and Figge ordered an unidentified 
officer to handcuff Williams’s right arm to the bench as well. 
Williams claims “her wrist was hurting” and she asked the 
unidentified officer to remove the handcuffs. Id. She also 
claims that the unidentified officer “approached her, twisted 
her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened if she did 
not give him her arm, he would break it.” Id. At some point 
while Williams was at City Hall, Figge asked her to calm down 
and she complied. 
 Williams was later found not guilty of disorderly 
conduct. She sued the City of York and the Officers in the 
District Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Against the Officers, 
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she asserted federal claims for excessive force and false arrest 
and state law claims for battery and false imprisonment. 
Against York, she asserted federal claims for excessive force 
and false arrest. The parties cross-moved for summary 
judgment, and the Officers claimed qualified immunity. The 
District Court granted summary judgment to York on the false 
arrest claim and to Officer Monte on the § 1983 false arrest and 
state law false imprisonment claims. It denied the motions in 
all other respects. 
 The Court concluded that “disputed issues of fact 
prevent[ed] application of qualified immunity to Sergeant 
Figge, Officer Monte, and Officer Seitz for [the] excessive 
force claim.” Id. at *8. It identified the disputed factual issues 
as “whether Officer Seitz threw [Williams] to the ground, and 
whether Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, or Officer Seitz 
twisted her arm, threw her against a wall, and handcuffed her 
wrists too tightly at City Hall.” Id. The Court also concluded it 
could not grant Figge and Seitz summary judgment on 
qualified immunity grounds for the false arrest claim “in light 
of . . . genuine issues of material fact.” Id. But it did not identify 
the factual issues to which it referred. Instead, after concluding 
that Figge and Seitz had reasonable suspicion to detain 
Williams, it said, “[a]ccording to [Williams’s] account of the 
incident . . . a reasonable police officer would [not] believe he 
had probable cause to arrest [Williams].” Id. at *8. 
 The Officers timely appealed the District Court’s order 





 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 pursuant 
to the collateral order doctrine. Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 772 F.3d 979, 985 (3d Cir. 2014). To the extent we have 
jurisdiction, our review is plenary. Id. at 986. 
 Summary judgment is proper when the record “shows 
that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. 
P. 56(a). Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Johnson v. 
Jones, 515 U.S. 304 (1995), we lack jurisdiction to review the 
District Court’s denial of qualified immunity when “the pretrial 
record sets forth a ‘genuine’ issue of fact for trial.” Id. at 320. 
If the District Court did not state the facts it assumed, though, 
we may “undertake a cumbersome review of the record to 
determine what facts the district court, in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party, likely assumed.” Id. at 319.1 
 
 1 Williams argues we lack jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal under Johnson. We disagree. Johnson does not apply if 
a district court’s determination that a fact is subject to 
reasonable dispute is “blatantly and demonstrably false.” 
Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 414 (3d Cir. 2007). 
And even when Johnson applies, it deprives us of jurisdiction 
“to consider whether the district court correctly identified the 
set of facts that the summary judgment record is sufficient to 
prove.” Ziccardi, 288 F.3d at 61 (emphasis added). It does not 




 In recognition of our limited jurisdiction under Johnson, 
we have announced two supervisory rules that apply whenever 
a district court denies a public official qualified immunity at 
summary judgment. 
 First, in Grant, we remanded a case involving multiple 
defendants so the district court could “analyze separately, and 
state findings with respect to, the specific conduct of each 
[defendant].” 98 F.3d at 126. We recognized as “crucial” to the 
qualified immunity analysis a “careful examination of the 
record . . . to establish . . . a detailed factual description of the 
actions of each individual defendant (viewed in a light most 
favorable to the plaintiff).” Id. at 122 (citing Johnson, 515 U.S. 
at 305). One purpose of the Grant rule is to ensure that district 
courts enforce the tenet, “manifest in our excessive force 
jurisprudence,” that a “plaintiff alleging that one or more 
officers engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the 
‘personal involvement’ of each named defendant to survive 
summary judgment and take that defendant to trial.” Jutrowski, 
904 F.3d at 285, 289. 
 Second, in Forbes, we announced a rule requiring 
district courts “to specify those material facts that are and are 
not subject to genuine dispute and explain their materiality.” 
313 F.3d at 146. This requirement reflects our understanding 
that because the “scope of our jurisdiction to review [a district 
 
identified by the district court is sufficient to establish a 
violation of a clearly established constitutional right.” Id. Our 
analysis adopts the District Court’s factual determinations 
except when they are blatantly and demonstrably false. And, 
when appropriate, we determine what facts the Court likely 




court’s decision denying summary judgment] depends upon 
the precise set of facts that the [d]istrict [c]ourt viewed as 
subject to dispute,” we are “hard pressed to carry out our 
assigned function” when district courts fail to specify the set of 
facts they assumed. Id. at 146, 148. While it is true that Johnson 
contemplates that we may review the record ourselves, 
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319, Forbes reduces the frequency with 
which we take on this “cumbersome” task and allows us the 
alternative of vacating and remanding. 
 Since announcing these supervisory rules, we have also 
recognized a narrow exception to the limits that Johnson places 
on our jurisdiction: “where the trial court’s determination that 
a fact is subject to reasonable dispute is blatantly and 
demonstrably false, a court of appeals may say so, even on 
interlocutory review.” Blaylock v. City of Phila., 504 F.3d 405, 
414 (3d Cir. 2007) (emphasis added).  
 This exception derives from the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007). There, a police 
officer (Scott) rammed the vehicle of a fleeing motorist 
(Harris), causing Harris to lose control of his vehicle and crash. 
See id. at 375. Harris sued for excessive force. See id. at 375–
76. The district court denied Scott qualified immunity, finding 
a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Harris 
“present[ed] an immediate threat to the safety of others,” 
Harris v. Coweta County, Georgia, 2003 WL 25419527, at *5 
(N.D. Ga. 2003), and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Scott, 550 
U.S. at 376.  
 The Supreme Court reversed, concluding there was no 
genuine dispute that Harris presented an immediate threat to 
others. See id. at 378, 386. In support, it cited a videotape of 
the incident that “quite clearly contradict[ed] the version of the 
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story told by [Harris].” Id. at 378. That video, the Court said, 
“resemble[d] a Hollywood-style car chase of the most 
frightening sort.” Id. at 380. The Court did not resolve the 
tension between its decision and Johnson. But in Blaylock, we 
explained that Scott “represent[s] the outer limit of the 
principle of Johnson.” Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414. 
B 
 The doctrine of qualified immunity shields officials 
from civil liability “insofar as their conduct does not violate 
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). “To resolve a claim of qualified 
immunity, [we] engage in a two-pronged inquiry: (1) whether 
the plaintiff sufficiently alleged the violation of a constitutional 
right, and (2) whether the right was clearly established at the 
time of the official’s conduct.” L.R. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 836 
F.3d 235, 241 (3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). We perform this inquiry “in the order we deem most 
appropriate for the particular case before us.” Santini v. 
Fuentes, 795 F.3d 410, 418 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Pearson v. 
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)). 
 A clearly established right must be so clear that every 
“reasonable official would [have understood] that what he is 
doing violates that right.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 
635, 640 (1987). We do not charge officials with such an 
understanding unless existing precedent has “placed the 
statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. 
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011). And we examine an 
official’s “particular conduct” id. at 742, in “the specific 
context of the case.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001) 
(overturned on other grounds); see also Mullenix v. Luna, 136 
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S. Ct. 305, 308 (2015) (noting that specificity is “especially 
important” in the Fourth Amendment context, where it is 
sometimes difficult for an officer to determine how relevant 
legal doctrines will apply to the factual situation before him). 
In short, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” Malley 
v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986). 
III 
 Williams claims excessive force arising out of the 
Officers’ conduct at the scene of her arrest and at City Hall. As 
we shall explain, the District Court did not comply with our 
supervisory rules in conducting its qualified immunity 
analysis, and it erred in concluding that the Officers are not 
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. So we will 
reverse. 
A 
 A cause of action exists under § 1983 when a law 
enforcement officer uses force so excessive that it violates the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution. See Brown v. Borough of Chambersburg, 903 
F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir. 1990). To maintain an excessive force 
claim, “a plaintiff must show that a seizure occurred and that it 
was unreasonable.” Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 
515 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, 
the parties agree that Williams’s detention and arrest 
constituted a seizure, so the District Court had to consider only 
whether the force officers used was reasonable. 
 “The test of reasonableness under the Fourth 
Amendment is whether under the totality of the circumstances, 
14 
 
‘the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the 
facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to 
their underlying intent or motivations.” Kopec v. Tate, 361 
F.3d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 
U.S. 386, 387 (1989)). The Supreme Court has cautioned that 
“[t]he calculus of reasonableness must embody allowance for 
the fact that police officers are often forced to make split-
second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, 
and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–
97. 
B 
 We address separately the excessive force Williams 
alleges took place at the scene of the arrest and at City Hall. 
1 
 Relative to the scene of the arrest, Williams claims: (1) 
Seitz threw her to the ground; (2) officers failed to loosen her 
handcuffs; and (3) officers put a knee to her back, tripped her, 
and were “forceful and rough” in handling her. 
  The District Court found “[t]he undisputed facts 
establish that Officer Seitz handcuffed [Williams] at the time 
of her arrest and an officer placed his knee on [Williams’s] 
back. Williams, 2018 WL 5994603, at *7. The Court also noted 
Williams “alleges that during her arrest, Officer Seitz threw her 
to the ground and officers were forceful and rough in handling 
her.” Id. The Court determined these facts, if true, “would 
establish that the officers’ use of force was excessive in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment,” but that it could not 
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resolve these factual disputes because “the reasonableness of 
the force used should be determined by a jury.” Id. 
 Accepting the facts the District Court identified, Seitz 
did not violate Williams’s constitutional rights by throwing her 
to the ground. The parties do not dispute that officers were 
responding to a shots-fired call, Williams was running in close 
proximity to the shooting, and when Figge ordered her to get 
on the ground, she ran to the porch of a house and started 
pounding on the door instead of complying with his order. 
Given these facts, it was not unreasonable for Seitz to throw 
Williams to the ground. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97. So 
the District Court erred in concluding Seitz was not entitled to 
qualified immunity. 
 Nor can Williams show that Figge, Monte, or Seitz 
violated her constitutional rights by failing to loosen her 
handcuffs. We have declined to hold officers liable in such 
circumstances unless they are notified of an arrestee’s pain. In 
Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2004), for example, 
Kopec claimed excessive force when the arresting officer 
failed to loosen his handcuffs. Id. at 777. We reversed a 
summary judgment in favor of the officer because Kopec’s 
pain would have been obvious to the officer. See id. at 774. 
Specifically, Kopec complained repeatedly about the pain and 
“began to faint.” Id. We cautioned that our opinion “should not 
be overread as we do not intend to open the floodgates to a 
torrent of handcuff claims.” Id. at 777. Consistent with that 
admonition, we later held, in Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208 
(3d Cir. 2005), that a plaintiff’s mere “complain[t] of pain to 
unidentified officers who allegedly passed the information” on 




 In this appeal, the District Court did not state whether it 
assumed Williams notified her arresting officers of her pain. 
Because this fact is plainly material, the Court’s failure to state 
it violated the Forbes rule. Instead of remanding, though, we 
will exercise our authority under Johnson to “undertake a . . . 
review of the record to determine what facts the district court, 
in the light most favorable to [Williams], likely assumed.” 
Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319.  
 On this record, Williams cannot show her arresting 
officers received notice of her pain. It’s true that Williams 
denied the Officers’ statement that she “never complained at 
the scene of her arrest about being in pain from handcuffs or 
otherwise.” App. 92a. But her only support for that denial was 
the dashcam footage, which she said shows she “complain[ed] 
vociferously about her abuse at the hands of the police.” App. 
435a. We have reviewed the video footage. See Scott, 550 U.S. 
at 378–81; Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414. It shows Williams 
complained only about her “wedgie.” She said nothing about 
pain from her handcuffs. Because this evidence is insufficient 
for a reasonable jury to conclude that the Officers received 
notice of Williams’s pain, see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986), the District Court erred in denying 
them qualified immunity for failing to loosen Williams’s 
handcuffs, see Kopec, 361 F.3d at 774. 
 Finally, Williams’s allegations that certain unidentified 
officers put a knee to her back, tripped her, and were “forceful 
and rough” in handling her cannot survive summary judgment. 
We reiterate that a “plaintiff alleging that one or more officers 
engaged in unconstitutional conduct must establish the 
‘personal involvement’ of each named defendant to survive 
summary judgment and take that defendant to trial.” Jutrowski, 
904 F.3d at 285. In Jutrowski, a police officer kicked Jutrowski 
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in the face, breaking his nose and his eye socket. Id. at 286. 
Because Jutrowski was “pinned to the pavement when the 
excessive force occurred” and was “unable to identify his 
assailant,” he brought excessive force claims against four 
police officers. Id. at 284. Each officer “assert[ed] he neither 
inflicted the blow himself nor saw anyone else do so.” Id. And 
the dashcam footage did not capture the incident. See id. at 287. 
The district court granted summary judgment to all four 
officers, explaining that because Jutrowski could not “identify 
which Defendant kicked him,” he was asking “the Court to 
guess which individual Officer Defendant committed the 
alleged wrong.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 2017 WL 
1395484, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2017).  
 On appeal, we rejected Jutrowski’s argument that “so 
long as a plaintiff can show that some officer used excessive 
force, he may haul before a jury all officers who were ‘in the 
immediate vicinity of where excessive force occurred’ without 
any proof of their personal involvement.” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d 
at 289 (citation omitted). After discovery, Jutrowski “still 
[could not] ‘identify the actor that kicked him.’” Id. at 292. So 
we refused to subject to trial “at least three defendants who are 
‘free of liability.’” Id. (quoting Howell v. Cataldi, 464 F.2d 
272, 283 (3d Cir. 1972)). 
 Jutrowski’s central tenet—that “a defendant’s § 1983 
liability must be predicated on his direct and personal 
involvement in the alleged violation”—is “manifest in our 
excessive force jurisprudence.” 904 F.3d at 289. Yet the 
District Court did not state whether Figge, Monte, or Seitz 
could have been one of the unidentified officers that allegedly 
put a knee to Williams’s back, tripped her, and were “forceful 
and rough” in handling her. The Court’s failure to address these 
factual disputes violated the Forbes rule, but we will once 
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again “undertake a . . . review of the record to determine what 
facts the district court, in the light most favorable to 
[Williams], likely assumed.” Johnson, 515 U.S. at 319.  
 The record shows Williams cannot establish the 
personal involvement of any of the Officers. At summary 
judgment, Williams conceded she “cannot specifically 
describe what each officer at the scene of her arrest did.” App. 
439a, 443a–44a. So the District Court erred in concluding that 
the Officers are not entitled to qualified immunity for allegedly 
putting a knee to Williams’s back, tripping her, and being 
“forceful and rough” in handling her. See Jutrowski, 904 F.3d 
at 292. 
 For all the reasons stated, we will reverse the District 
Court’s denial of summary judgment as to Williams’s 
excessive force claim insofar as it relates to the officers’ 
conduct at the scene of her arrest. 
2 
 At City Hall, Williams claims excessive force because: 
(1) officers failed to loosen her handcuffs; and (2) an officer 
twisted her arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened to 
break her arm. 
 The District Court identified a genuine dispute of 
material fact about “whether Sergeant Figge, Officer Monte, or 
Officer Seitz twisted [Williams’s] arm, threw her against a 
wall, and handcuffed her wrists too tightly at City Hall.” 
Williams, 2018 WL 5994603, at *8.  
 Under Johnson, we generally lack jurisdiction to review 
the genuineness of this kind of dispute. See 515 U.S. at 319–
19 
 
20. But having scrutinized the record in this appeal, we 
conclude the District Court’s determination is “blatantly and 
demonstrably false.” Thus, this case—like Scott—falls outside 
Johnson’s “outer limit,” Blaylock, 504 F.3d at 414, and we will 
exercise jurisdiction to review the genuineness of the factual 
dispute the District Court identified. 
 Before discussing the record, we pause to observe that 
the District Court failed to undertake the kind of “detailed 
factual description of the actions of each individual defendant” 
that the Grant rule requires. 98 F.3d at 122 (citing Johnson, 
515 U.S. at 305). The Court determined there is a genuine 
dispute of material fact about whether Figge, Monte, or Seitz 
twisted Williams’s arm, threw her against a wall, and 
handcuffed her wrists too tightly at City Hall. But the facts 
apparently underlying its determination are not specific to any 
of these officers. Elsewhere in its opinion, the Court says 
Williams “contends that officers twisted her arm, threw her 
against the wall, and threatened to break her arm if she did not 
provide it to the officer.” Williams, 2018 WL 5994603, at *7 
(emphasis added). And it says the parties “dispute whether 
[Williams] notified other officers [besides Figge] of her 
discomfort” in handcuffs. Id. at *2, *7 (emphasis added).  But 
facts about what unidentified officers did at City Hall shed no 
light on what Figge, Monte, or Seitz did there. 
 Because of this flaw in the District Court’s 
decisionmaking process, the record “quite clearly 
contradict[s]” its determination that a genuine dispute of 
material fact exists about whether the Officers twisted 
Williams’s arm, threw her against the wall, or handcuffed her 
too tightly. Scott, 550 U.S. at 378. First and most importantly, 
in Williams’s summary judgment briefing, she conceded she 
cannot establish that any of the Officers were personally 
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involved in the violations she alleges. There she stated: “While 
[the Officers] are correct that [she] cannot specifically describe 
what each officer at City Hall did, she does describe the 
physical interactions she had with multiple officers at City 
Hall.” App. 455a.  
 Moreover, Williams’s deposition testimony precludes 
the possibility that any of the Officers are the unidentified 
officer who allegedly twisted her arm and threw her against a 
wall. Williams testified that the unidentified officer was not 
present at her conduct hearing, but both Figge and Monte were 
there, so that excludes them. And the undisputed record rules 
out Seitz. Williams testified that the unidentified officer 
handcuffed her right arm to the bench—not her left arm. But 
Seitz testified—and Williams confirmed—that he handcuffed 
Williams’s left arm to the bench. In fact, Williams positively 
identified the unidentified officer as someone other than the 
Officers she sued here. When Williams was at her mother’s 
house, she saw a picture of the unidentified officer, learned that 
he goes by the name “Terminator,” and later identified him as 
one Officer Hansel. App. 271a–72a, 290a–91a. 
 As for the circumstances surrounding Williams’s 
handcuffing, the record shows that Figge could not have 
handcuffed Williams at City Hall because Seitz handcuffed 
Williams’s left arm, and Figge ordered another officer to 
handcuff her right arm. 
 Finally, at oral argument before this Court, Williams’s 
attorney conceded “the basis of any claim against th[e] 
Officers” for excessive force at City Hall “would be a failure-
to-intervene claim.” Oral Arg. 38:50 (emphasis added). So 
even Williams’s counsel could not defend the genuineness of 
the factual dispute the District Court identified. 
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 For all these reasons, no reasonable juror could find the 
Officers failed to loosen Williams’s handcuffs or twisted her 
arm, threw her against the wall, and threatened to break her 
arm. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The District Court’s contrary 
determination is unfounded. And because the record shows 
Williams cannot establish the personal involvement of any of 
the Officers, the Court erred in concluding they are not entitled 
to qualified immunity. See Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 292. 
 Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court’s order 
to the extent it denied summary judgment as to Williams’s 
excessive force claim relative to the officers’ conduct at City 
Hall.  
IV 
 We next consider Williams’s claim for false arrest. The 
District Court erred in concluding that Figge and Seitz are not 
entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. So we will reverse 
the Court’s denial of summary judgment in relevant part. 
 On appeal, Figge and Seitz claim they had probable 
cause to arrest Williams for disorderly conduct and escape. In 
the alternative, they argue they did not violate clearly 
established law in arresting Williams. As relevant here, the 
Court concluded that because “there is a factual dispute 
regarding exactly when [Williams] stopped at Sergeant Figge’s 
command,” it “could not determine if there was sufficient 
probable cause for criminal escape.” Williams, 2018 WL 
5994603, at *6.  
 “To state a claim for false arrest under the Fourth 
Amendment, a plaintiff must establish: (1) that there was an 
arrest; and (2) that the arrest was made without probable 
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cause.” James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d 
Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). “[P]robable cause exists if there 
is a fair probability that the person committed the crime at 
issue.” Dempsey v. Bucknell Univ., 834 F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 
2016) (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations 
omitted). “While probable cause to arrest requires more than 
mere suspicion, the law recognizes that probable cause 
determinations have to be made on the spot under pressure and 
do not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence.” Paff 
v. Kaltenbach, 204 F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 Accepting as true the facts the District Court identified, 
Figge and Seitz did not violate clearly established law in 
arresting Williams. Under Pennsylvania law, a person is guilty 
of escape “if he unlawfully removes himself from official 
detention,” which includes “any . . . detention for law 
enforcement purposes.” 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5121 (a), (e). 
And while Figge and Seitz did not cite Williams for escape, 
“an arrest is lawful if the officer had probable cause to arrest 
for any offense, not just the offense cited at the time of arrest 
or booking.” Dist. of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 584 
n.2 (2018) (citations omitted). The determination of whether a 
person criminally escapes depends on “an evaluation of the 
specific circumstances” of an individual case. Com. v. Woody, 
939 A.2d 359, 362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d through order 
974 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2009). And for the specific facts of this 
case, Pennsylvania law does not clearly establish that Figge 
and Seitz lacked probable cause to arrest Williams for criminal 
escape. 
 On the one hand, in Commonwealth v. Stewart, 648 
A.2d 797 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), a uniformed police officer 
received a dispatch about a domestic disturbance involving 
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Stewart. See id. The officer pulled Stewart over, approached 
Stewart’s vehicle with his gun drawn, and ordered Stewart to 
put his hands on the dashboard. See id. Stewart drove off and 
was charged and convicted of escape. See id. On appeal, 
Stewart argued that he was not under “detention” within the 
meaning of the escape statute. Id. at 798. The Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania rejected this argument, holding that because it 
was “clear that [the officer] exhibited a show of authority,” it 
was “inconceivable that a reasonable person would believe he 
or she is free to leave.” Id.; see also, e.g., Com. v. Fountain, 
811 A.2d 24, 25, 27 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) (holding 
Commonwealth made a prima facie case as to escape charge 
where police officer approached defendant with her canine, 
told defendant not to run and that she had a warrant for his 
arrest, and defendant “ran into a residence, and locked the 
door”). 
On the other hand, in Commonwealth v. Woody, a 
uniformed police officer in a marked police car instructed 
Woody, who was fleeing on foot after a traffic stop, to “stop 
and get on the ground.” 939 A.2d at 363. The Superior Court 
of Pennsylvania determined that Woody was “never officially 
detained,” and vacated his conviction for criminal escape.  Id.  
 This case falls in an uncertain space between Stewart 
and Woody. Like the officer in Stewart, Figge was in uniform 
and exhibited a show of authority by drawing his gun. And just 
as Stewart did not comply with the officer’s order to put his 
hands on the dashboard, Williams did not comply with Figge’s 
order to get on the ground. In fact, the parties do not dispute 
that she ran to the porch of a house and started pounding on the 
door. But if on-foot flight from a uniformed officer in a marked 
police vehicle was insufficient for a criminal escape conviction 
in Woody, it may be that probable cause did not exist here. That 
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uncertainty in the law does not strip the officers here of 
qualified immunity; rather it insulates them from liability for 
their determination that a “fair probability” existed that 
Williams committed escape. Dempsey, 834 F.3d at 467.  
 Accordingly, Figge and Monte are entitled to qualified 
immunity on Williams’s claim for false arrest.  
* * * 
 For the reasons stated, we will reverse the Court’s order 
denying the Officers summary judgment.  
